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ABSTRACT 
Involvement in South Africa remains a critical issue for many multinational companies. 
They are concerned about the security and the long-term viability of operations there, as 
well as their appropriateness. These concerns are reinforced and intensified by domestic 
stakeholder pressure on these companies, not least of which is the criticism from public 
interest groups. Yet joining the corporate exodus from South Africa is also fraught with 
difficulties - a strategic decision to divest South African operations impacts on the firm 
in many ways. A sound strategy is required whether the decision is to stay or to go. 
Using recent UK research, this paper examines the strategy adopted by Barclays Bank, 
one of the major companies to pull out of South Africa, both when the company was 
still committed to involvement there and after the withdrawal decision was made. It 
addresses a strategy for corporate social responsibility. 
The decision to leave was of great importance for the bank and South Africa, as 
Barclays was a major investor whose subsidiary there was the largest bank in the 
country. The paper analyses the extent to which the departure from South Africa can be 
attributed to the expressed abhorrence of apartheid and a desire to realise corporate 
social responsibility. Given the prominence of public interest groups seeking Barclays’ 
withdrawal - with a consumer boycott campaign sustained for over ten years - an 
assessment of their role is also made. Actions by interest groups are examined in terms 
of the business and society relationship and a strategic framework for corporate response 
on this and other issues is developed, identifying four strategic options. 
A major conclusion from the analysis of the Barclays case is that the ambiguity 
surrounding the idea of social responsibility in business presents difficulties in strategy 
formulation. The concept of the social control of business, elsewhere proposed, can be 
more usefully applied. The paper concludes by looking at the wider implications for 
corporate strategists, beyond the South African withdrawal dilemma. The results of the 
study have a wider application and are pertinent, for example, to the current issues 
involving financial institutions as a result of the exposure of fraud linked to firms such 
as Guinness in the United Kingdom and those associated with Ivan Boesky in the United 
States. Other issues for which the study has relevance include employment practices, 
pollution, animal welfare (for cosmetics companies particularly) and multinational 
compliance with the Arab Boycott. A strategy for corporate social responsibility is 
required in many circumstances and in response to many pressures. As this paper 
demonstrates, formulating and implementing such a strategy is both highly critical and 
highly complex. 
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BUSINESS AND APARTHEID 
Apartheid in South Africa stirs many people. It is purportedly a system whereby the 
many races of South Africa may coexist securely and separately, different but equal. 
Yet it is in effect a racist ideology advancing separate development of the peoples of 
South Africa to maintain the economic exploitation of the black majority. There are 
many countries whose inhabitants suffer oppression and indignities at the hands of the 
state; conditions are arguably as bad in some South American countries as they are in 
South Africa. However as, indeed, the South African government commented in a series 
of advertisements in the national press in the UK in 1983, ‘South Africa arouses more 
controversy than almost any other country in the world’. This is not only due to the 
extent of the oppression in South Africa but also because of the way in which it is 
institutionalised. Racism and the exploitation of the black population is firmly 
embodied within the culture and legislation of South Africa, with, for example, blacks 
unable to vote, and the Group Areas Act prohibiting people of different races from 
living in the same area. The immorality of such a system is deeply offensive to 
countries of the First World (and the whites in South Africa do not wish their country to 
be seen as part of the Third World). Multinationals operating in South Africa are, as a 
consequence of doing business there, seen to be implicated in apartheid. 
The criticism of corporate involvement in South Africa goes beyond an objection to 
companies remaining in a country which so clearly flouts the democratic principles 
cherished in their home countries. The economic function of apartheid and the role of 
business in apparently maintaining and benefiting from it suggests that those 
multinationals operating in South Africa bear some responsibility for apartheid. Indeed, 
it has long been argued that there is a convergence of interest between business in South 
Africa and the upholders of apartheid - that South Africa’s apartheid system has always 
been a mutually beneficial alliance between a minority government and private business. 
This is exemplified in apartheid’s role in the provision of cheap labour, particularly in 
establishing a migratory labour system, which even the UK government has admitted, 
‘robs the individual of the basic freedom to seek and obtain the job of his choice. It 
also causes grave social and family problems’ (1). Accordingly, critics of a Marxist 
persuasion argue that capitalism has created apartheid. As Charles Longford puts it: 
‘Behind all the different manifestations of apartheid stands the mighty economic 
machine of South African capitalism. This machine absorbs cheap black labour, 
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puts it through the wheels of industry, mining and agriculture and then expels it 
to distant reservations for the unemployed until the system requires more labour’ 
(2). 
While this reference to the effective role of the ‘homelands’ (where many of South 
Africa’s blacks are forced to live) is largely accurate, this does not confirm a simple 
causal relationship between capitalism and apartheid. In a recent and thorough study by 
Merle Lipton, Capitalism and Apartheid, a more sophisticated analysis is suggested: 
‘Apartheid cannot simply be explained as the outcome of capitalism or of racism. Its 
origins lie in a complex interaction between class interests (of white labour as well as of 
sections of capital) and racism/ethnicity, reinforced by ideological and security factors’ 
(3). She shows that while South African mining, agricultural and white labour interests 
were generally served by apartheid, often the interests of manufacturing were not, The 
limits to black advancement have also placed constraints on South African manufacturing 
industry. 
The debate on the extent of corporate culpability for apartheid notwithstanding, 
involvement in South Africa is a major issue of social responsibility in business. 
Continuing operations in South Africa is defended by arguing that economic progress 
will necessitate the incorporation of the blacks and end apartheid. So Ruth First, 
Jonathan Steele and Christabel Gurney wrote in The South African Connection, at the 
time of the first real show of public concern about British firms in South Africa: 
‘In their reply to the suggestion that this involvement puts a special onus on 
British firms to help to end apartheid, businessmen generally give one of two 
answers: the first is that business and politics (like sport and politics) should not 
be mixed and the second that apartheid may be objectionable, but that business is 
“doing its bit behind the scenes” to change it; the alternative to this reform-by- 
participation would, after all, be trying to bring down South Africa’s regime and 
consequently her economy. So let us opt for reform through business rather than 
for revolution’ (4). 
Although written over fifteen years ago, the argument for involvement in South Africa 
because of the need for reform by participation, remains the principal defence for 
companies choosing to stay there. There was a public outcry following the publication 
of The South African Connection and, more specifically, a series of articles in the 
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Guardian by Adam Raphael, in March 1973, that revealed that only three out of a 
hundred British companies investigated were paying all their employees above the 
poverty line. The link between low wages in South Africa and high profits for British 
companies operating there had been clearly established. Moreover, there was little 
evidence that industrialization was breaking down apartheid. This provided a 
considerable impetus to the Anti-Apartheid Movement which, since 1960, had been 
campaigning for a consumer boycott of South African goods and international sanctions 
against South Africa. While there has been pressure exerted on companies involved in 
South Africa but based in countries other than Britain, particularly the United States in 
recent years, it needs to be noted that the UK has always been the largest investor in 
South Africa, with British investment comprising around 50% of all foreign investment 
(5). Britain also has a lot of trade with South Africa and, for historical reasons, bears 
some responsibility for the situation there. Many sources suggest apartheid’s origins go 
back to British colonial rule of the Cape, prior to the Act of Union in 1910. 
Critics of corporate involvement in South Africa see little evidence of this reform by 
participation having any impact on apartheid. They argue for more coercive measures 
against the South African government to force change or failing that, revolution, with 
the armed seizure of control by the African National Congress (ANC) supported by 
external pressure in the form of economic sanctions. While condemning apartheid, 
Western governments and many firms have largely resisted the pressure for 
disinvolvement in the South African economy, advocating what is known as ‘constructive 
engagement’ to protect their interests and as a means for the dismantling of apartheid. 
Countries with considerable trade and investment interests in South Africa, such as the 
United Kingdom, West Germany and the United States, have been notably most opposed 
to sanctions against South Africa. 
SANCTIONS OR CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT? 
A great variety of measures are available to those outside South Africa that wish to 
encourage the South African government to end apartheid (6). The ‘encouragement’ 
intended by these measures may be in the form of relatively welcome inducements to 
speed up what is seen as a process of reform in South Africa or it may take the form of 
less gentle persuasion with a view to convincing the South African authorities of the 
need to act to dismantle apartheid or create the conditions for the government’s 
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overthrow and its replacement by majority rule. Hence, simply stated, there is a choice 
between inducement and persuasion in positive measures and coercion to force change or 
revolution through the use of negative and punitive measures. The former involves 
activities such as the provision of assistance to blacks for education or housing, codes of 
conduct encouraging foreign multinationals in South Africa to break down apartheid in 
the firm, and general support for the South African economy, encouraging trade and 
other links. The latter approach includes sports and cultural boycotts, trade sanctions 
and disinvestment. Clearly a variety of purposes may underlie the use of any particular 
measure, according to the interests at stake and despite the manifest intent. 
The use, or otherwise, of international economic sanctions against South Africa is closely 
tied to the case for and against business involvement in South Africa and domestic 
pressures on the firm as a result of this. South Africa’s reliance on Western trade and 
investment has led to many calls for economic sanctions. Direct investment has, since 
the Sharpeville massacre in 1960, declined because of criticism but been replaced by 
indirect investment. Yet trade and both direct and indirect investment involves an 
interdependence. This has encouraged Western governments, particularly Britain and the 
United States, to seek stability in South Africa, which in effect has meant maintaining 
apartheid. Accordingly, up to the mid-1980s, the only significant sanctions imposed on 
South Africa were the UN arms embargo and the OPEC oil boycott. 
Four principal arguments are advanced against sanctions (7). Firstly, there are the costs 
for those imposing them. The West would lose trade, which includes strategic raw 
materials such as platinum, chromium and manganese, for which South Africa is the 
major source of supply. Furthermore, investments might be seized and there is also the 
issue of the country’s perceived political and military signficance as a bastion against 
communism. So, for the West, there is an economic, political and strategic 
interdependence involved. There would also be considerable costs incurred by the black 
front-line states in Southern Africa, such as Mozambique, if they too supported 
sanctions. Secondly, it is argued that sanctions would harm the blacks in South Africa 
most, but then it is said they are already suffering and are prepared to support sanctions 
even if jobs are lost. Thirdly, there are doubts about the effectiveness of sanctions. 
Historically, there is some support for this, particularly in cases where countervailing 
measures were employed. However, sanctions have been effective in the past, they 
continue to be employed on other issues and against other countries, and, if their 
effectiveness is doubted, this begs the question, ‘why oppose them?’ The final argument 
6 
against sanctions lies in the argument for constructive engagement, for bridge-building 
and change from within. This has always been the most prominent reason for not 
imposing sanctions on South Africa. 
The period of increased unrest in South Africa which started in 1984 (seen as a 
consequence of the creation of the Tricameral Parliament, involving for the first time 
ethnic groups known as ‘coloureds’ and ‘Asians’ in South Africa), highlighted the failure 
of constructive engagement and it has widely come to be seen as tacit support for 
apartheid. Firms remaining in South Africa continue to argue that it is a genuine 
strategy for bringing about a peaceful end to apartheid. Yet while international 
sanctions have not been forthcoming, various measures have been taken against the 
domestic operations of firms remaining in South Africa, particularly ethical investment 
actions and consumer boycotts. In the UK, up to one in four consumers prefer not to 
buy South African goods in protest at apartheid (8). The consumer boycott is, as a 
moral act, an expression by the individual of his or her preferences on the issue, a 
sanction by the individual as the state is not prepared to act. It also adds to the 
aggregate of pressure for change. The most well-known consumer boycott within the 
UK is of Barclays Bank. 
BARCLAYS IN SOUTH AFRICA 
Barclays is a major financial institution in world terms. Employing over 125,000 people 
in more than 80 countries, it has more offices worldwide than any other British bank. 
In the early 1980s its subsidiary in South Africa, Barclays National Bank, was the biggest 
bank in the country. It employed about 25,000 people (20% of Barclays’ world total) in 
around 1,000 branches, serving more than 3+ million customers. Within the Barclays 
group, the South African operation was traditionally the most profitable, although 1984 
did see almost a halving of South African profits from f l18m to f65m (just under 8% of 
total group profits of f824m). This was, according to the Annual Report, due to ‘the 
depressed state of the economy and the prolonged drought’. Until 1981-82, the South 
African subsidiary was the largest of Barclay’s international operations in terms of total 
assets, it was then overtaken by the United States subsidiary. 
Barclays had been in South Africa for more than 60 years and claimed to be ‘part of the 




an Afrikaner company in 1925. Together with another British bank, Standard Ch&tered;-, ’ ‘.’ 
it dominated South African finance, with the two banks controlling around two thirds of 
all South African domestic banking business. Both British banks had majority holdings 
in their South African subsidiaries. In the early 1970s Barclays had a 100% 
shareholding, however this had been steadily reduced in accordance with the 
requirement of South African law that it should be no more than 50% by 1986. In 1984 
Barclays’ holding in Barclays National Bank was 50.45%. Standard Chartered’s 
shareholding had been reduced more rapidly and more substantially and in early 1985 
Standard gave up majority control by not taking up a rights issue, reducing the 
shareholding from 50.3% to 41.9% with further reductions anticipated. It was denied 
that there was any political or economic signif icance in the change though some saw it 
as ‘a decisive step in British withdrawal from involvement in South Africa’. A Barclays 
spokesman said ‘Our present intention is to maintain our current majority position but it 
is something that we will continue to review as a matter of normal commercial 
judgement’. 
The most tangible evidence of European government opposit ion to apartheid at this time  
was the 1977 EEC Code of Conduct governing European firms  operating in South 
Africa. This, indeed, was the only measure the European Community had taken against 
South Africa up to the m id-1980s and it was clearly a  positive measure within a  strategy 
of constructive engagement.  The code originated from a British code of practice 
formulated in 1974, in response to the public outcry following Raphael’s expose of 
British firms’ activities in South Africa. Its manifest purpose was to demonstrate EEC 
opposit ion to apartheid, to show European firms  were a force for good in South Africa 
and improve the performance of European firms  in South Africa against set standards. 
In so doing, it would be an attempt to dismantle apartheid within individual firms  in 
South Africa and set an example to South African firms  and South African society at 
large. However, the latent purpose of the code was arguably that it would defuse 
criticism of corporate involvement in South Africa and avoid the imposition of 
disinvestment measures and other negative sanctions. The form of the code tended to 
confirm this view: it was voluntary, reporting was ‘asked’ for and compl iance only 
‘urged’; its provisions were only very general, with pay the only pass or fail criterion; 
and, unlike the US Sullivan Code introduced immediately prior to the EEC Code, its 
provisions were static and not seeking continual improvement from firms  operating in 
South Africa (9). Until the code was updated and strengthened in 1985, its main 







Relations within the undertaking, particularly the recognition and encouragement 
of trade unions. 
Migrant labour - described as an ‘instrument of the policy of apartheid’ - the 
effects of which employers ‘should make it their concern to alleviate’. 
Pay, which should exceed the Minimum Effective Level (MEL). 
Wage structure and black advancement, particularly equal pay for equal work and 
training programmes for blacks. 
Fringe benefits; the improvement of employees’ living conditions, education and so 
on. 
Desegregation at work and equal working conditions. 
Reporting requirements of companies varied according to the amount of equity held by a 
(British) company and the number of black employees. The code principally referred to 
those with more than 50% of the equity of a South African company and employing 20 
or more black Africans. These companies were to report annually on the provisions 
given above to their national governments, which would review progress made (10). The 
1984 analysis of companies’ reports for 1982-83 is based on reports from 142 UK 
companies meeting the equity and number of black employees criteria (11). 
Barclays had an obligation to report under the EEC Code and unlike a number of other 
UK firms (12), chose to do so. Indeed, Barclays publicised its report under the code, 
though this was not required (it became a requirement under the later and current 
EEC Code). Barclays’ 1982-83 submission to the Department of Trade and Industry 
(DTI) showed that just over 70% of their employees in South Africa were white. Blacks 
represented just under 15%, coloureds about 10% and Asians 5% (South African 
government categories). Elsewhere Barclays reported that about a third of the blacks 
employed were clerical staff, the remainder were cleaners (predominantly), chauffeurs 
and messengers. Between 1981 and 1982, however, the increase in black clerical staff 
was 14.4% against an increase of only 3.3% for whites, who were almost entirely 
employed in clerical jobs. For non-white staff as a whole, there was an increase of 72% 
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between 1978 and 1983, compared with 27% for white staff; while the ratio of white to 
non-white clerical staff (including management) was 6.3:1 in 1978 compared with 3.7:1 
in 1984. There were 77 non-white executives in Barclays National Bank in 1982 and the 
figure was expected to rise to 119 by 1984, compared with only 18 in 1977. So although 
representation - particularly of blacks (73% of South Africa’s population at the time) - 
was exceedingly disproportionate, there was evidence of some improvement. However, 
at least some of this improvement is attributable to the increase in the numbers of blacks 
in the bank’s network in the ‘homelands’, where one would expect to find black 
employees and this would be encouraged by the South African government. 
In 1973 the bank formally recognised the National Union of Bank Employees of South 
Africa (NUBESA) as the trade union for Asian and coloured employees. The South 
African Bank Employees Union (SABEU) was formally recognised as the trade union for 
black African employees in 1977. It was the bank’s declared policy to encourage active 
interest in union matters. On the other Code of Conduct provisions, Barclays claimed 
the section on migrant labour to be of ‘little relevance’, that there was equal pay for 
equal work, full integration of all races at work and in social activities, and that wages 
for black Africans conformed to the code’s requirements (though it has been suggested 
on this point that Barclays paid only just above the minimum amount specified and that 
payment was based on actual family size rather than the nominal figure - providing a 
saving where this was below average). 
Barclays provided a number of fringe benefits for their non-white employees, including 
preferential interest rates for housing loans, non-contributory pensions, educational 
support for children and medical insurance. Barclays is a large corporate donor to 
charities in the UK (the largest in 1982 according to the Charities Aid Foundation), and 
in its Annual Report for 1984 the Chairman observes that the Group ‘now puts over f5m 
worldwide (includina in excess of f 1.5m in South Africa) back into the community’. 
This comes under the heading ‘Social responsibility including charitable and other 
donations’ in the Report of the Directors. Barclays managers believed they did a lot for 
the blacks in South Africa. Some of their critics accepted this, but viewed it as 
paternalistic and hardly a challenge to apartheid, despite Barclays’ claim that they did as 
they chose in South Africa. 
Barclays inevitably provided some support for the South African government as a 
consequence of operating in South Africa. Apart from loans made, Barclays held a 
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proportion of deposits in government securities in accordance with the South African 
Bank Act. This provision is a customary central bank requirement, applying to all 
commercial banks in South Africa, and the funds are entirely of South African origin. 
It did, however, give rise to an international outcry when the bank bought Defence 
Bonds, even though any purchase of government stock provides money for government 
expenditure on whatever it chooses. These bonds were purchased in 1976 because of the 
attractive rate of interest and, it has been suggested, to appease the South African 
government, concerned at the time about the South African subsidiary’s ‘unpatriotic’ 
stance. They were sold only a year later, on the first possible redemption day, because, 
as the Financial Times reported, of the ‘embarrassment’ of the British parent bank. 
Barclays participation in loans to South Africa was described at the time as ‘very 
modest’. (Euromoney reported that German and Swiss banks were the ‘most active’ 
lenders.) 
Barclays involvement in South Africa was described as constructive engagement. They 
used Chester Cracker’s term in their publicity (the term constructive engagement is 
generally attributed to Dr Chester Cracker, US Assistant Secretary of State for African 
Affairs). Accordingly, Barclays* literature (in response to (and acknowledgement of) ‘a 
campaign to persuade people not to bank with it’), noted that ‘For many years the bank 
has stated categorically that it deplores the evil system of apartheid’. In pursing 
constructive engagement it is stated: 
‘The bank accepts that remaining in South Africa imposes on it an obligation to 
work for change and to do what it can to bring about a fairer society by peaceful 
means. That obligation applies to its business activities, its employment practices 
and its social policy.’ 
Yet there was little evidence of a pioneering approach in this. It seems that the 
observation by First et al, in 1972, was probably still largely accurate: in reference to the 
chairman of Barclays, they wrote, ‘Sir Frederic did not appear to see a major reforming 
role for the bank; rather, it would do as well for itself as it could whatever happened - 
as Sir Frederic put it, rather more delicately, “When changes come in Southern Africa, as 
they surely will, the bank’s long and worldwide experience will stand it and all the 
people there in good stead”.’ 
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The bank’s use of the constructive engagement argument was, of course, almost identical 
to that advanced for Western involvement as a whole in South Africa and discussed 
above. It had many of the same strengths and weaknesses. The trend towards indirect 
forms of investment in South Africa had singled out the banks for attack. All the 
British banks lent to South Africa, but Barclays had a major subsidiary and was, 
additionally, particularly vulnerable because of its high visibility, with branches on most 
British high streets. This led to a focus on Barclays by anti-apartheid groups such that 
it became known as ‘the apartheid bank’. In sum, Barclays defended their involvement 
in South Africa using the constructive engagement argument and referring, in particular, 
to their compliance with the EEC Code of Conduct. Although they had a 
disproportionately small number of black employees there was evidence of some 
improvement within the bank. This their critics were prepared to accept but dismissed, 
for apartheid continued and all constructive engagement seemed to achieve, whether by 
firms or governments, was cosmetic changes. 
THE APARTHEID BANK 
End loans to South Africa (ELTSA), the principal pressure group acting against Barclays, 
was formed in 1973 by the Reverend David Haslam, a Methodist Superintendent 
Minister in Harlesden, North London. He was the Secretary to ELTSA and its main 
organiser, as well as Vice-Chairman of War on Want. The impetus for its formation was 
the discovery that loans were being made by Midland Bank to the South African 
government and (against British law at that time) to Rhodesia, as exposed by the 
Guardian. ELTSA’s first success was in prompting the Midland’s decision to make a 
statement saying that they would not make any further unspecified loans to the South 
African government or its agencies. This followed three to four years of pressure from 
ELTSA, including resolutions to the AGM in 1976 and 1977. (The first got about 6% of 
the vote and the second about 7%, quite substantial for activist shareholder resolutions.) 
After this success, ELTSA shifted its attention to Barclays as it was the biggest bank in 
South Africa and British. It effectively took over the boycott Barclays campaign from a 
number of other groups that had been involved in it, such as the Anti-Apartheid 
Movement, though many of these organisations continued to participate. Barclays was 
the prime focus of ELTSA’s efforts and the only firm it directed its boycott campaign 
towards, but it did not ignore the activities of other British banks. 
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ELTSA’s logo features a black face behind a barbed-wire pound sign, indicating 
recognition of the role of capital in the oppression of the blacks in South Africa. 
Accordingly, its three principal aims were: 
1) To draw attention to the role Britain plays in supporting the apartheid regime in 
South Africa, particularly through the involvement of British banks and capital. 
2) To put pressure on banks to withdraw from South Africa and to end all financial 
links with the regime. 
3) To help mobilise the British public in support of the struggle against apartheid. 
Overall, however, ELTSA’s concern as its name implies, was to end all loans to the 
South African government or its agencies and even to private companies. The latter are 
included because, as Haslam commented ‘there’s not a lot to choose between lending to a 
government agency like ESCOM or to a large South African company like AECI . . . it’s 
all money into the South African economy and as long as the economy remains strong it 
will use the apartheid system and benefit from the apartheid system and the exploitation 
thereof’ (13). He suggests such a concern has the support of the black African 
population: ‘our line is now really taken from the African people themselves - their 
organisations - that all foreign capital helps to bolster apartheid and therefore it ought to 
be stopped’. Haslam described ELTSA as an ‘action group’ rather than an organisation. 
There were about eight or ten active in the group - attending meetings and so on - and 
one paid employee in the office. So ELTSA was quite limited in terms of resources and 
personnel, though there were three to four hundred on its mailing list. 
David Haslam wants to see a liberated South Africa with a democratically elected 
majority government. So this can be achieved, he would like to see economic pressure 
by Western governments and companies to be so great that the South African economy 
‘was really under serious threat’. He believes ‘that’s the only thing that’s likely to get 
them to change with the minimum of violence . . . one doesn’t say peacefully anymore - 
there’s a war going on already’. ELTSA’s contribution he recognised to be modest, but 
part of the aggregate of pressure for change: 
‘let’s face it, modern international banks and multinational companies are 
extremely powerful institutions. They are always going to be economically more 
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powerful than we are. The kind of thing we are doing is just a small part, vis-a- 
vis South Africa, of a much wider struggle in which the leaders are the black 
people of South Africa who are struggling for their freedom. We’re doing what 
we’re doing because they say it assists in the struggle, probably not so much 
directly as indirectly in that they know there are people far away, putting pressure 
on the banks and companies which they see as the symbols of the apartheid 
system, and that encourages them to keep on struggling.’ 
ELTSA’s criticism of Barclays was based on its perception of Barclays’ role in supporting 
apartheid and in rejection of the constructive engagement argument. Haslam comments, 
‘What Barclays do in South Africa contributes to the oppression and the death in many 
cases of black people, and poor black children and so on’. The specific criticisms made 
in the pressure group’s literature - regarding loans to the South African government, the 
sale of Krugerrands, and publicity campaigns aimed at attracting troops, for example - 
all stem from this. Haslam suggested constructive engagement had been ‘totally 
discredited’ and was ‘completely useless’. He saw little evidence of genuine 
improvement in the South African situation, the apartheid system had tightened but 
‘foreign companies just don’t seem prepared to actually do anything about it’. While 
wages weren’t quite as low as they used to be, he conceded, changes by companies, like 
those made by the South African government, were merely cosmetic. He referred, in 
illustration, to the claim of equal pay for equal work when ‘most of their black workers 
are cleaners, security people, and most of their white workers are the clerks and 
management’. (It’s interesting to add here that some white trade unions have advocated 
equal pay for equal work, not as a liberal move but as a way of protecting-the jobs of 
their members. With equal pay for equal work employers would have to pay blacks the 
same as whites in the same job, giving no economic incentive to take on black labour.) 
ELTSA’s strategy involved, through the use of the consumer boycott, putting ‘moral, 
public opinion type pressure on the bank’. Its actions, or tactics, were designed to get 
the publicity that this demands. ELTSA took a critical interest in all the major British 
banks involved in South Africa - such as the Midland, National Westminster, Standard 
Chartered, or Hill Samuel - putting out pamphlets about them, attending their AGM’s, 
issuing press releases. But the prime focus was Barclays, so in addition to these actions, 
Barclays was also subject to: picketing, particularly in the university fresher period when 
many new students might otherwise open accounts with Barclays; a new leaflet outlining 
Barclays’ activities in South Africa, issued every 18 months or so for bulk distribution; 
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‘City actions’ to call attention to Barclays; and the annual report from the Barclays 
Shadow Board. If ELTSA discovered something that Barclays had done and it wished to 
expose, this would be subject to close attention for a  lim ited period. Barclays’ activities 
and ELTSA’s successes were recorded in the quarterly ELTSA newsletter, about thirty 
issues of which had been publ ished up to the m id-1980s. This also covered other banks’ 
activities and provided information on the South African situtation in general and the 
boycott campaigns in particular. 
The Barclays Shadow Report was innovatory and proved quite successful. This was first 
produced in 1981 and appeared annually ever since. The Barclays Shadow Board was set 
up to monitor the activities of Barclays Bank in South Africa and Nambia. It comprised 
14 public figures, including Neil Kinnock (Leader of the Labour Party). The Board’s 
Annual Report provided ‘alternative information on Barclays’ involvement in South 
Africa which is m  contained in the bank’s Annual Report’. As the Board’s chairman 
for the first report, Professor M ichael Dummett, wrote ‘Unlike an actual board of 
directors, we are not primarily concerned with financial performance. Our focus is, 
rather, upon the social, political and economic effects of the company’s operations’. The 
reports had a wide circulation and ELTSA received a lot of positive feedback on them. 
Even Barclays acknowledged their effectiveness. In their ‘South Africa and Namibia 
Fact Sheet’ (produced for their managers so that they could respond to queries and 
criticisms on Barclays involvement in South Africa and not for general distribution), 
they write: 
‘one of the most consistent critics of the bank’s operations, End Loans to Southern 
Africa, has produced a glossy pamphlet entitled ‘Barclays Shadow Report’. 
Because of its appearance, its slightly less strident language and its association 
with a  group of ‘shadow board’ directors, this document gains greater credence 
than earlier leaflets among those who have not heard of or will not listen to the 
bank’s case’. 
The Shadow Reports contain, in keeping with the Barclays Annual Report, an address or 
statement by the chairman and the Report of the Directors. The earlier reports 
concluded with a  third section, Barclays at W o rk in South Africa, focusing on one aspect 
of Barclays involvement in South Africa, such as the role of loans. The chairman’s 
statement serves as an introduction to the report, explaining its purpose and highlighting 
some of the achievements of the campaign over the previous year. The bulk of the 
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report however is the Report of the Directors. This is predominantly about Barclays 
involvement in South Africa - a sort of social audit - referring in particular to events of 
the past year, but it also includes a review of the boycott campaign identifying major 
account withdrawals. The 1981 report, for example, describes Barclays’ South African 
connection’, its links with the South African government, its attempts to attract 
customers from the armed forces (including a Barclays’ advertisement from a military 
journal), Barclays’ involvement in loans for the construction of a further Sasol plant, the 
recognition by Barclays of the Bantustans in two (now withdrawn) publications, and 
Barclays’ efforts to encourage trade with South Africa. Lost accounts listed included the 
London Borough of Lambeth, the National Union of Public Employees, and the High 
Commission of Grenada in London. The Lambeth account was withdrawn because ‘it 
was offensive to the substantial black population in the borough for the council to bank 
with a company so deeply involved in South Africa’. The report claims that with a 
turnover of f 1,20Om, it was Barclays’ tenth largest account in Britain. 
Other ELTSA literature included leaflets with titles such as ‘Are You Banking on 
Apartheid?’ and ‘Ten Reasons to Boycott Barclays’. They presented ELTSA’s case and 
urged the reader to boycott Barclays and persuade friends and organisations to withdraw 
from Barclays, writing to the bank to explain why and informing ELTSA. The leaflets 
also encouraged the sale of Barclays shares - ‘The only reason for keeping a small 
amount of shares is if the body wants to make a protest to the bank’ - and writing to 
MPs calling for sanctions. The reader is advised ‘Always state the same position in 
discussions - Barclays must withdraw from Southern Africa, until invited back by 
genuinely independent governments’. 
Some leaflets referred to the involvement of other British banks in making loans to 
South Africa, but Barclays is described as the worst and ‘Because of Barclays massive 
involvement . . . We therefore call for a boycott of Barclays - apartheid’s chief banker’. 
It is noted that the Co-op Bank has a stated policy of no loans to South Africa and 
neither the Trustees Savings Bank (TSB) nor National Giro are able to lend overseas. 
ELTSA had a briefing paper available on request giving details of the facilities offered 
by these banks, including the number of branches, availability of cheque cards, bank 
charges, etc. This was intended for consumers and local authorities. Other ELTSA 
material included badges, posters, fake credit slips (advising the group’s case and for 
leaving on display in Barclays branches), stickers for cheques ‘No loans to South Africa’, 
and papers from a conference organised by ELTSA. 
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ELTSA’s most prominent achievement of the campaign was persuading institutions to 
withdraw their accounts, particularly the local authorities. In addition to Lambeth 
withdrawing their account, other authorities followed suit. Some authorities, particularly 
Sheffield under David Blunkett, declared themselves ‘apartheid-free’ zones, which meant 
they didn’t bank with Barclays and boycotted South African goods. David Haslam 
suggested there had been ‘hundreds and hundreds’ of account withdrawals during the 
campaign. Some of these had involved extensive correspondence with the bank, in some 
cases over two or three years. Other people had simply changed their accounts and 
written to inform ELTSA, so Haslam claimed ‘there are quite a lot of withdrawals that 
the bank doesn’t know anything about’. There are then those that have chosen not to 
open accounts with Barclays in the first place. 
ELTSA’s greatest success was probably in ensuring that ‘Barclays has become known 
internationally as the Western world’s biggest collaborator with apartheid’ and as such 
has ‘a fairly dirty name amongst quite a substantial number of the population’. Yet 
although the loss by Barclays of actual or potential consumer accounts was one of 
ELTSA’s major concerns, it did not in itself provide the publicity sought and thereby 
add further momentum to the campaign. Picketing and demonstrations and the Shadow 
Reports provided publicity, but perhaps most important was the loss of major accounts. 
Commercial organisations were not particularly interested in ELTSA’s case. But various 
non-commerical institutions were, especially those with more ethical, moral or 
philanthropic ‘missions’. ELTSA’s strategy with these institutions was to get the national 
organisation to take up a position on the issue and then disseminate information to the 
constituent organisations. This proved effective with church bodies, trade unions and 
community relations councils, for example. The outcome was often reports in the 
institutions’ publications and even the national press if the withdrawal was substantial. 
So the national press reported account transfers by a wide variety of institutions from a 
Church of England theological college, to Warwick University, to the British 
Psychological Society. Withdrawals by church groups, and there were many - although 
as Haslam points out, there are three to four thousand Methodist churches in Britain and 
ten to twenty thousand Anglican churches - were particularly significant. They made 
Barclays a bit anxious as churches usually involve a fairly traditional body of people. 
Barclays’ response to this criticism could, of course, have been to withdraw from South 
Africa. This, however, ELTSA thought unlikely. The bank’s efforts up to the mid- 
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1980s consisted, essentially, of public relations activities designed to present their case 
for involvement in South Africa. Their policy was ‘founded on the belief that economic 
ties and investment are the only viable instruments of peaceful change in that country*. 
Their publicity material suggested they agreed with their critics that apartheid was 
wholly unacceptable. However, they differed when it came to the question of how 
change could be brought about. Barclays suggested their critics ignored the positive role 
Barclays played in South Africa. They referred, in particular, to: encouragement given 
to African business, including special projects; to their compliance with the EEC Code 
of Conduct; to steps taken to improve African advancement by providing training 
programmes and in-house schooling; and, finally, to help given ‘to the under- 
priviledged majority in South Africa’ outside the bank, by way of donations to 
educational, welfare and cultural schemes for the black community, and involvement in 
various projects such as the Urban Foundation. 
Barclays recognised the impact of disinvestment: ‘it would show the world in a very 
public way that it [Barclays] actively disapproved of many of the policies of the South 
African government’. But they suggested that as a bank cannot simply shut down, it 
might well sell its shareholding to others less inclined to promote change. Moreover, as 
the value of their shareholding represented less than 14% of the total British investment 
in South Africa and under 1% of all Western investment there, it was unlikely that the 
disposal of their investment would end apartheid. In answer to the question ‘Why is 
Barclays subject to a boycott?’ they suggested that the main reason Barclays was singled 
out from the many companies with investments in South Africa was because it had a 
branch in almost every high street in England and Wales and was thus an accessible 
target. Barclays suggested that they followed the policy of the British government in 
continuing involvement in South Africa. 
Timothy Bevan, Barclays’ chairman, played down the effect of criticism on Barclays. In 
a press statement he said ‘the amount of business lost is astonishingly small when 
compared to the heat engendered by the debate’. Barclays’ perspective on the boycott 
was that the pressure group were ‘looking for quarry basically, to actually push their 
own propaganda out’ (14). Students were the traditional target for these efforts but 
attention was given to others, such as local authorities, particularly after encouragement 
was given in a letter from the National Executive Committee (NEC) of the Labour Party 
to all Labour councils. The trade unions had been similarly approached by Anti- 
Apartheid (a lot of the unions are members of Anti-Apartheid). The outcome for 
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Barclays - though ‘it’s not too bad really’ - was that institutional customers and private 
customers in certain age groups were coming to the bank and saying ‘This is terrible! 
This is awful! What’s going on ?’ They had, however, only heard one side of the story. 
As a Barclays manager put it: 
‘This is the way it comes through to us. Someone goes in at the back end of a 
business and says . . . in the committe form “Come-on chaps, I’ve got a motion I 
want to put forward, a resolution I want to put forward: consider Barclays as your 
bankers, consider the terrible things in South Africa.” They’ve been primed by 
people like ELTSA. You see ELTSA are digging away from the other side. Then 
it comes through to us and we put our case.’ 
It was suggested that it was usually a left-wing element responsible for this. Barclays’ 
response was to try and put its position and allow people to judge on the ‘facts’, though 
this can be difficult as people understood and responded to the emotional issues but did 
not always understand the problem. Often talking was not possible, some did not want 
to think any differently or even listen - ‘if their views were watered down, if they 
weren’t allowed to believe what they are presently believing, they wouldn’t enjoy it’. 
This was particularly the case with student critics - Barclays most vociferous problem. 
Often, it was claimed, they were ill-informed, on Barclays policies in South Africa for 
example. They were not, however, keen to listen to constructive engagement arguments. 
Barclays kept a record of actions, such as picketing at their branches. According to 
Barclays, these actions were generally on university campuses during the fresher period. 
Usually around 6 people were involved at each site, perhaps only 200 in the whole 
country. The pickets typically worked in rotation. Sometimes they’d picket a number of 
branches in the locality. However, in spite of these actions, Barclays claimed to be 
increasing their share of new student business. While there was a certain amount of 
day-to-day monitoring of the boycott activity, Barclays said there was no cumulative 
monitoring of account closures and figures for this were therefore not available. Neither 
were there costing figures available accounting for lost business and the costs of 
responding to criticism in terms of public relations activities. The direct costs, however, 
of lost accounts were said to be negligible, though this refers to accounts closed rather 
than accounts not opened. As a Barclays manager put it ‘banks are like football teams, 
if you join a bank you stay loyal’. This seemed to continue despite ELTSA’s efforts. 
There was greater concern over the loss of institutional accounts as a result of the 
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boycott. However, despite regular criticism at the Barclays AGM, ethical investment 
was not considered to be a serious threat because it was not thought possible for 
investors to have a balanced portfolio of blue chip shares without having companies that 
invested in South Africa. 
Overall, Barclays said they didn’t lose very much business. Surprise was expressed at the 
high number (10%) claiming to boycott Barclays in survey research (15), the findings of 
which were shown to a Barclays manager. It was suggested that this might be due to 
people wishing to appear concerned. However, the even higher awareness of the boycott 
(91%) was not considered surprising. It was suggested that Barclays as a whole probably 
received less than one letter a week from private individuals threatening account closure. 
Moreover, it was considered unlikely that an account would be closed without reason 
having been given where South Africa was involved. Besides which, branch managers 
are expected to find out, as a matter of procedure, reasons for account closures. It was 
even claimed that not only was there only a little business lost, but that some was even 
gained as a consequence of the boycott action. Yet there was still considerable concern 
about the criticism received. Criticism hurts: 
‘I’m afraid we’re very sensitive to criticism. It’s not damaging but - you see, if 
there’s something wrong with your bank account . . . you will have within the week, 
probably 2 or 3 days, a fairly balanced response and we will sort it . . . it’s our 
general policy, we don’t like to be criticised. We believe ourselves to be the best 
bank in Britain . . . we’re very proud and protect our image.’ 
Account closures were not so much the concern as the damage to the corporate image. 
Accordingly, Barclays did not respond directly to the pressure group activity - ‘we put 
out information. All we’re trying to do is to inform the puzzled critics . . . creating a 
corporate image, effectively. We’re just getting the message over’. It was suggested that 
Barclays would stay in South Africa even if it were less profitable, because 
representation is important for the company’s structure. Moreover, Barclays said they 
believed in what they were doing for South Africa and the profits were almost 
irrelevant. People like David Haslam - with whom they’d had discussions - wanted 
precipitative change. Barclays believed peaceful change was to be preferred. If faced 
with a similar situation of pressure group criticism they would again look to see if their 
position was defendable. They would probably act differently, it was suggested, if they 
were found to have been involved in financing a government such as that administered 
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by Idi Amin. They believed involvement in South Africa was more than defendable, it 
was laudable. 
This was not, however, the perspective of Barclays’ critics. The pressure on Barclays 
because of their South African involvement continued to mount. This pressure seemed 
likely to be a feature of Barclays’ marketing environment for as long as the bank 
remained in South Africa. In sum, while Barclays claimed the economic impact of the 
boycott was small, being widely known as ‘the apartheid bank’ took its toll. And 
Barclays’ corporate image was tarnished internationally as well as in the UK, 
particularly in the Third World. 
WITHDRAWAL 
In 1984 David Haslam still believed that the benefits for Barclays of staying in South 
Africa far outweighed the costs, as he put it: ‘cost-benefit wise the gap is still pretty 
wide . . . their profits in South Africa are going up all the time - we’re talking about tens 
of millions - we’re not into their losing that kind of money through our campaign’. 
Meanwhile at Barclays, there was clear concern about the issue. As a Barclays manager 
commented: 
‘You see, we have three thousand branches, and they’re all on street corners, 
they’re very vulnerable. We’re the easy target. And a lot of our critics, if you 
really got them to sit down quietly and talk to you - and they have done this to 
me - will tell you that, OK, they appreciate that Barclays is a damn good 
employer, they appreciate that we’re trying hard, but we’re still the Aunt Sallies of 
the bunch. If they knock us down, then maybe others will follow.’ 
Haslam had not accounted for the increasing unrest in South Africa which, during 1984 
to 1986, came to be daily portrayed on television and in the national press. This 
provided a considerable stimulus to the boycott Barclays campaign, particularly among 
UK students. Nor had Haslam accounted for any moral dimension in Barclays’ 
decision-making on whether to stay in South Africa. The predominance over this period 
of the South African situation in current affairs and the pressure on Western 
governments to impose sanctions on South Africa highlighted Barclays involvement there. 
The deteriorating economic conditions in South Africa and Barclays’ planned expansion 
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in the United States (where at this time consumer activism on South Africa was greater 
on the whole than in the UK), added further weight to the case for a clear strategy on 
South Africa. These factors led to what appeared to be the first step in a phased 
withdrawal from South Africa. 
In 1978 P W Botha had become Prime Minister of South Africa and advocated ‘adapt or 
die’. The extent of reform was limited, mostly it involved doing away with apartheid 
laws which had de facto become meaningless, such as the ‘pass laws’ (these had in the 
past kept blacks out of white areas where they were now increasingly needed). The 
most significant reform was in trade union recognition. However, what probably counts 
as the most notably ill-fated reform was the creation of the Tricameral Parliament. 
Until 1983 only whites had voting rights and representation in parliament. The denial of 
democratic rights to more than 80% of South Africa’s population remains one of the 
most fundamental criticisms of the South African regime. Yet white South Africans 
argue that under a majority rule South Africa ‘tribalism would out’ and they would have 
no say in South Africa’s affairs. Under ‘grand apartheid’ it was envisaged that all ethnic 
groups would have democratic rights; blacks, Asians and coloureds within their 
‘homelands’. This policy of separate development (16) failed to convince the outside 
world, particularly as the ‘homelands’ represented only 13% of South Africa’s land mass 
and included some of poorest land in the country. The independence of the ‘homelands’ 
was not recognised and the argument that people had votes in these ‘homelands’ 
dismissed. Moreover, despite a continuation under Botha of a policy of forced removal 
of people to the ‘homelands’, it had come to be recognised that blacks in townships such 
as Soweto would have to stay there because of their role in the economy. In 1983 under 
a new constitution, a house in parliament was created for the coloureds and another for 
the Asians. This still, given its organisation, left the whites and particularly the state 
president (Botha) in charge. It was presented as a reform, but was seen as a sop to 
Western public opinion. Moreover, as it was the result of a referendum in which whites 
had only voted by two to one in favour of the new constitution, it had alienated many 
conservative Afrikaners. 
The elections for the new parliament were substantially boycotted by the Asians and 
coloureds, with only a 20% turnout. When the parliament opened in 1984 there was 
rioting in the townships, the blacks of course had been entirely excluded from even this 
modest reform. The government’s response was to try and crush the disturbances by 
22 
force. Yet they continued, with many lives lost, into 1985. Meanwhile, the economic 
situation had deteriorated and the foreign banks, led by US bank Chase Manhattan 
(under pressure in its domestic market), chose to withhold funds until reforms proved 
sufficent to restore stability. The economic situation deteriorated further with this move 
and the growing threat of international sanctions and the government unilaterally put a 
freeze on its loan repayments and sought to reschedule them. Various countries had 
imposed sanctions on South Africa but not countries with substantial interests there. 
The UK government, although opposed to sanctions, was in late 1985 obliged to support 
some selective sanctions at the Commonwealth Conference in Nassau. These were: bans 
on Krugerrand sales, government to government loans and official trade missions; largely 
token measures. Slightly more substantial sanctions were, eventually, agreed by the EEC 
in 1986 and, in the same year, the United States also imposed sanctions under the Anti- 
Apartheid Act. Some concessions were made by the South African government, but the 
success of the State of Emergency in curbing media reports on South Africa in the West 
and therefore reducing public pressure for further sanctions, and the endorsement of a 
hard-line by the South African electorate in the May 1987 elections, reduced the 
impetus for more rapid change and encouraged the ‘laager’ mentality. 
Shortly before the economic crisis seriously hit South Africa, and exchange controls 
introduced and loan repayments frozen, Barclays reduced its stake in Barclays National 
Bank. As the Financial Times reported on August 15, 1985, Barclays did not take up a 
rights issue announced the previous day, ending its majority shareholding. There had 
been rumours of a complete sell-off to South African interests, particularly as Chase had 
recently announced its intention to run down its South African exposure. In the event, 
Barclays’ shareholding was reduced from 50.4% to 40.4%. Barclays remained the largest 
shareholder, but one of the two firms that took up the issue, Anglo American (with 
whom Barclays had always had close links), now had a 25% shareholding. Barclays 
National Bank was no longer referred to as a subsidiary but as an associated company, 
though it remained part of the Barclays group. It was intended to change the name of 
the bank by the end of the decade. 
Barclays stressed that the move was not disinvestment. Peter Leslie, Barclays’ chief 
general manager, described it as ‘a commercial decision’. But it would be inevitable, he 
supposed, that some people would seek to connect the move to South Africa’s current 
troubles or criticisms from anti-apartheid supporters of Barclays’ involvement in the 
country. Leslie would only concede that there was no connection except insofar as 
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economic and political factors usually formed part of commercial decisions. It was noted 
that South African profits had fallen such that in the first half of 1985, Barclays 
National Bank, although 8.5% of Barclays’ total assets of f7lbn and formerly the largest 
profit-maker, contributed only 1% of the firm’s profits. David Haslam commented that 
the Barclays’ decision ‘clearly demonstrates its anxiety about that country’s stability’. 
However, Barclays stuck to the constructive engagement argument for involvement in 
South Africa ‘Barclays has always maintained that its presence in South Africa is a force 
for good’. Mr Leslie said that the group believed this would continue to be true, even 
though Barclays would no longer exercise control over Barclays National Bank. 
THE MERIT OF THE MARKET SYSTEM 
In 1982 Sir Antony Tuke was succeeded as chairman by Timothy Bevan. Tuke had 
never been receptive to criticism of Barclays’ involvement in South Africa, standing firm 
on the constructive engagement argument. Bevan, however, was said to genuinely detest 
apartheid (17) and, moreover, was less susceptible to pressure from Pretoria as the 
relative importance of Barclays’ South African operations had diminished. Neither did 
he have a history of long associations with white South Africans and his views were also 
shared by some of the newer members of the Barclays board. These views became 
public when, in November 1985, Bevan mounted a critical attack on the South African 
regime in a speech to branch managers. He, moreover, revealed contacts with the ANC 
- he had met Oliver Tambo, president of the ANC, in London. The new and dynamic 
chief executive of Barclays National Bank, Chris Bail, had also been having meetings 
with black nationalists. Indeed, Ball’s radical stance (for a South African business 
executive) was earning for Barclays National Bank in South Africa an anti-apartheid 
label! 
Meanwhile, the corporate exodus was taking hold. Business Week reported that three 
times as many US companies had halted all or part of their South African operations in 
the year up to September 1985, compared with the previous year. Ford, Apple 
Computers, and Singer were among the 18 companies disinvesting. As the Economist 
explained, also in September 1985: ‘The reason for the flight from South Africa is that 
no businessman wants to be caught propping up a government whose social policy leads 
to the sjamboking and shooting of people on television - so, eventually, to money-losing 
revolution’. 
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In 1986 Bevan’s stance against apartheid - for moral or commercial reasons (or both) - 
hardened still further. Barclays had, with the other banks, despite a request to do 
otherwise from the president of the Anti-Apartheid Movement, agreed to a rescheduling 
of South African debt in March 1986, though on tougher terms than expected by 
Pretoria. In the same month Sir Timothy also explained Barclays’ reasons for not 
maintaining a majority shareholding in Barclays National Bank the previous August. His 
Address by the Chairman in Barclays 1985 Annual Report gives two reasons: 
‘Firstly, because we are conscious of the prudent need not to have too many eggs 
in one basket, particularly as we and many others deplore the slow movement of 
the South African government in dismantling institutionalized racial discrimination 
- a system that is not worthy of any nation that regards itself as part of the 
Western democratic world. Secondly, it has long been our policy to reduce our 
shareholdings in major retail investments abroad.’ 
His statement refers to some change in South Africa and Barclays National’s ‘liberalizing 
influence’. Caught in a cleft stick, still in South Africa but wanting to disinvest, he 
both condemned apartheid and yet reinforced the constuctive engagement argument: 
‘To those who take their accounts away from us on ideological grounds, as is their 
right, I would pose one simple question: “Do you want us to stand back and wash 
our hands of apartheid or do you want us to continue to strengthen the tide of 
change?” Apartheid is unjust and immoral and so rightly condemned; equally it 
seems to me to be unjust to condemn us as supporters of the system, when in fact 
Barclays National is amongst the leaders in South Africa in opposition to it.’ 
By the time of the May 1986 board meeting it had been decided to fully withdraw from 
South Africa. In November, agreement was finally reached. Barclays sold its remaining 
stake in Barclays National Bank, which had a current market valuation of f221m, for 
f82m (at the financial rand exchange rate) on November 24, 1986. It was bought by 
Anglo American and Anglo American controlled companies. Bevan said the reasons 
were ‘basically commercial’. Ball acknowledged the likely impact on the South African 
economy but was positive about the opportunities for the South African bank. It was, 
he said, ‘a unique opportunity, giving us the potential to strengthen our position both 
domestically and internationally*. He contrasted the move with the disinvestments earlier 
25 
in 1986 of multinationals such as IBM and General Motors by noting the bank was not 
dependent on outside supplies. He referred to Barclays’ reluctance to take this move and 
explained, ‘They are not doing it to achieve a political objective. They are doing it 
because they are under political pressure*. In an editorial headed ‘Moral pressure in the 
market’, the Financial Times clearly attributed the withdrawal to the boycott campaign: 
‘ordinary people, revolted by what they have learned about the [apartheid] system 
from the news media, are not much concerned with the sometimes agonizing 
decisions faced by those actually involved; they want to make their opposition felt, 
and have proved again that they can bring effective pressure to bear on 
commercial organisations, even if they cannot move foreign governments. Moral 
pressure of this kind - whether against apartheid, whaling, the fur trade, 
vivisection or even the defence industry - is an increasingly important fact of 
business life.’ 
It had emerged in August 1986, from the leak of an internal Barclays document to Anti- 
Apartheid, that Barclays’ share of the student market had dropped from 27% to 17% 
between 1983 and 1985. Students are a vital sector of the market for banks because of 
their likely future prosperity and the high level of customer loyalty within the industry; 
people generally tend to stay with the bank they first join. Chris Ball later suggested 
the drop was even more substantial than the ten percentage points widely cited, 
explaining the withdrawal as almost entirely due to this loss of business. He did, 
however, also acknowledge the importance of Barclays’ US expansion plans and the 
limitations placed on them by involvement in South Africa (18). The ‘ha&e factor’ of 
continually having to respond to vociferous pressure groups must also have played a part 
in Barclays’ decision to withdraw. It may even have contributed to Barclays’ lacklustre 
performance of recent years and low morale. 
Anthony Sampson (author of Black and Gold) suggests the impact on South Africa was 
considerable: ‘the withdrawal was perhaps the most fundamental blow so far of those 
that have begun to rain on the South African economy’. Yet it has hardly forced great 
concessions out of South Africa. The Anti-Apartheid groups claimed Barclays’ 
withdrawal to be a major success. In many ways for them, it was, although they cannot 
claim full responsibility for it. It was even a victory for capitalism. As the Financial 
Times commented: 
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‘The whole merit of the market system is that it is the best system yet devised for 
recording and satisfying consumer preferences, and if these preferences rank the 
rights of minorities or humane farming, alongside the elegance of a design or the 
palatability of a strawberry flavour, it does the customers nothing but credit.’ 
In the 1986 Annual Report Bevan observed that the sale of the remaining 40% holding 
in Barclays National was ‘the major event internationally’ and that the South African 
bank had become a correspondent bank ‘along with the other 4,000 or so relationships 
that we have’. He made four points on the withdrawal: 
1) ‘Our customer base, particularly in the United Kingdom and the United States, 
was beginning to be adversely affected by our minority holding in Barclays 
National, which only provided 24% of our total Group profits at the half year; 
2) Our operation in South Africa was one of the building blocks of the original, 
colonial-orientated Barclays Bank (Dominion, Colonial and Overseas): now, sixty 
years later, our sights for expansion are more set on North America, Europe and 
the Pacific, whilst we continue to value highly our considerable operations 
elsewhere in Africa where we have 340 offices with 10,000 staff, excluding our 
associated company in Nigeria; 
3) We are satisfied that Barclays National will continue to be a liberal force in that 
unhappy country; 
4) The general reaction of our customers and the public has been favourable and only 
the prejudiced will continue to carp.’ 
The fourth point and the observation about the correspondent bank relationship reflected 
continued criticism of the bank by anti-apartheid groups. ELTSA attended the AGM in 
1987 and urged Barclays to sever all links with South Africa. However, in May 1987 it 
was announced that the boycott was to be called off the following month. The Anti- 
Apartheid Movement’s chairman said: ‘We are not giving Barclays a completely clean bill 
of health but the grounds for targeting them alone no longer exist.’ 
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OR CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 
exodus from South Africa poses many interesting questions for 
;ademics as well as practitioners, especially those working in the areas of 
;gy and business and society. Particularly intriguing is the extent to which 
lecision to depart from South Africa can be attributed to an (expressed) 
of apartheid and a desire to realise corporate social responsibility and public 
. * ‘What strategies can oups seeking corporate withdrawals. Key queStIOns are. 
d in response to public interest group criticisms?’ and ‘How does the company 
a strategy for corporate social responsibility?’ 
Barclays case, as in the boycott of Nest16 over its marketing Of infant formula 0J 
hird World, and many other cases of public interest group pressure on the firm, 
strategic options may be identified. The response strategies are ignore, fight, 
,ge/explain, and comply (19). These strategies are shown in Table 1 with illustrative 
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CULPABILITY OF THE FIRM AND SUPPORT FOR THE PRESSURE 
GROUP ON THE ISSUE (CORRESPONDS TO STRATEGY AND 
TACTIC APPROPRIATENESS) 
Table I: Strategies in ReSeonse to Public Interest Grouo~ 
Table 1 shows that strategy appropriateness should be determined by an assessment of 
the culpability of the firm and the support for the pressure group. A simple cost- 
benefit analysis cannot be conducted in response to a consumer boycott in the way 
suggested by David Halsam. Were one to be so cynical as to adopt this approach, it 
would soon become clear that the immediate economic impact of the boycott was only 
one consideration and, as in the Barclays case, the impact on corporate image and morale 
were also important if not overriding considerations. The strategy adopted therefore 
depends upon whether management feels its critics are right and how much support they 
have. 
Culpability and support go together because without support for the pressure group 
management need not do anything on the issue. Accordingly, where support and 
culpability are greatest, a compliance strategy is more likely or, at least, more sensible. 
Where support and culpability are negligible, an ignore strategy is likely. So, for 
example, if the pressure group hasn’t got a strong case and lacks support, management 
may successfully use a fight strategy. But if support is greater, it would be more likely 
to be successful using a fudge/explain strategy. Within a pluralistic model, culpability 
would equate with support for the pressure group. The pressure group would receive 
support in proportion to the ‘guilt’ of the firm and the importance attached to it. Hence 
to some extent the decision on the strategy management adopts is made for it. Barclays, 
for example, couldn’t have defended, even using a fudge/explain strategy, involvement 
with the Amin regime in Uganda. 
However, the complexity of social responsibility issues muddies the clear-cut process 
described above. Strategies in response to pressure groups have been identified, yet the 
choice of strategy is not as straightforward as suggested. Some managements may not 
see or be guided by their culpability and pluralism in practice has many imperfections. 
So management may be able to get away with acts that aren’t socially responsible because 
of this. Pressure group support and corporate guilt will not always equate and 
management may successfully employ a non-compliance strategy where there is a 
shortfall in support relative to great corporate guilt. Where the pressure group is 
‘wrong’, or perhaps has different priorities to management, yet still receives substantial 
support, then there may alternatively be a shortfall in corporate guilt relative to support. 
Management may then have to respond to the pressure group demands despite its relative 
lack of guilt. The strategy adopted has to reflect both assessments of culpability and 
support if management wishes to achieve its aims. 
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There is, of course, the position that management’s aims may include being socially 
responsible. In which case it would be argued that culpability should be the sole basis 
for the continuum and for determining strategy. However, this would be naive. Not 
because management is only socially responsible if it has to be. Although this may 
happen, it is not as simple as this because of the role of managerial values and 
differences in priorities. It is therefore appropriate that management should be guided 
by the level of support for the pressure group as well as its assessment of its guilt. 
The position taken here on the Barclays case is that the bank pursued a strategy for 
corporate social responsibility. To conclude this paper the rationale behind the adoption 
of this position and, perhaps more importantly, the meaning of corporate social 
responsibility in this context, can be usefully explained. It should be emphasised that 
this strategy for corporate social responsibility has relevance beyond the Barclays case 
and the issue of withdrawal from South Africa. Such a strategy is required in many 
circumstances and in response to many pressures. It is relevant, for example, to the 
current issues involving financial institutions as a result of the exposure of fraud linked 
to firms such as Guinness in the United Kingdom and those associated with Ivan Boesky 
in the United States. Other issues include employment practices, pollution, animal 
welfare (of significance for cosmetics companies particularly), and multinational 
compliance with the Arab Boycott. 
There are good arguments for sanctions against South Africa and good arguments for a 
constructive engagement approach. Ultimately, a preference must depend upon whether 
one believes coercion or conversion/accommodation will be more likely to be successful. 
In other words, is it expected that the South African authorities are going to be 
converted to a new perspective, or not converted but obliged to make some (adequate) 
changes, or coerced into ending apartheid? Similarly, firms, if genuinely concerned 
about change in South Africa, must decide whether withdrawal or reform-from-within 
is more likely to achieve an end to apartheid. Such a decision will be clouded by the 
interests at stake yet, equally so, by the external pressures on the firm. Accordingly, 
any explanation for Barclays departure from South Africa could not isolate a single 
determining factor. Barclays left South Africa because of the consumer boycott and 
other pressures on it in the UK market, which were having some immediate and 
growing economic impact but were more serious in their impact on the corporate image 
(at home and abroad) and morale, with potentially dire long-term consequences. 
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Additionally, however, Barclays also wished to develop further in the United States, 
where the South African link was a major constraint; its South African operation was 
less profitable and the South African economy unstable and deteriorating; and the 
Barclays board were convinced of the immorality of apartheid and disappointed with the 
slow pace of change in South Africa. 
A lot of the debate about sanctions addresses the case for disinvestment. Yet 
disinvestment is taking place without sanctions - 140 US companies have left South 
Africa since the start of the recent period of increased unrest. Arguably, they have not 
been socially responsible in doing so. Advocates of constructive engagement would say 
they have washed their hands of the problem. Involvement in South Africa remains a 
critical issue for many companies. Concerns about the security, appropriateness and 
long-term viability of operations there are brought into sharp focus by domestic 
stakeholder pressure on these companies. Disinvestment is complicated not only by 
whether it is possible to sell off one’s operations but to whom they should be sold. If it 
is not judged more responsible to stay then it must be decided who is to run the 
company when the parent withdraws. A local management buy-out may not ensure that 
good management practices continue and might lead to considerably worse conditions for 
black employees. General Motors’ mistake in this regard is salutory (20). 
Whether Barclays and the other companies that have withdrawn are socially responsible 
depends a lot on what one means by the term. A more useful concept is that of the 
social control of business, proposed elsewhere as the focus of the business and society 
discipline (21). The actions by public interest groups on social issues, such as 
involvement in South Africa, are efforts to seek social control of business. The aim is 
corporate social responsibility as these groups define it. If they succeed through the 
support of society at large, then the outcome is corporate social responsibility as society 
would define it. Perhaps the term social responsibility in business cannot be defined in 
the abstract, but only in the concrete reality of conflict resolution. Social responsibility 
in business can refer to corporate doctrines on good practice and charitable donations, 
but also be seen as the Dnd-result of an accommodation of different interests within 
society over a social issue. Barclays, therefore, had no choice but to pursue what, under 
this interpretation, amounted to a strategy for corporate social responsibility. 
A 
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